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RETROACTIVITY REVISITED
Michael J. Graetz*
JN three prior articles, I considered transitional problems of changes
the tax law.' My general analysis and its specific application to
the adoption of a consumption tax were criticized last year in this
journal by Avishai Shachar.2 By taking liabilities explicitly into ac-
count in considering tax transition rules, Shachar extended the fun-
damental principles generated by my theory of legal transitions.
Shachar, however, misunderstood or mischaracterized much of my
earlier work. 3
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author wishes to thank Jerry L. Mashaw and
Alvin C. Warren for helpful conversations.
I The first of these articles set forth a general analysis of changes in laws governing economic
transactions, focusing in particular on setting effective dates for new tax rules. See Graetz,
Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 47
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Graetz I]. The second applied this general theory of legal transitions
as part of an extensive analysis of the general problems of substituting a progressive consumption
tax for the current income tax. See Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92
HARv. L. REV. 1575 (979) [hereinafter cited as Graetz II]. The general theory also provided
the foundation for a third article suggesting that the minimum tax provisions of the current
income tax might be used as a transitional mechanism for moving to a broad-based, low-rate
income tax. See Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First Step in the Transition
to a "Flat-Rate" Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 527 (1983).
2 Shachar, From Income to Consumption Tax: Criteria for Rules of Transition, 97 HArv. L.
REV. I58I (1984).
3 For example, Shachar ranks me first among those who "argue that the new tax laws should
take effect on the date of enactment" and who "reject the argument that the effective date of
those provisions should be grandfathered for particular tax-favored or -disfavored assets or
activities." Id. at 1583 & n.12 (citing Graetz I, supra note x, at 87). In fact, I argued that
"neither efficiency nor fairness demand grandfathered effective dates" and that "phased-in or
delayed effective dates are often to be preferred to grandfathering" for mitigating large impacts
on wealth resulting from changes in the tax law. See Graetz I, supra note i, at 87.
Shachar also contends that I "implicitly assumed" a certain "misguided" approach, see
Shachar, supra note 2, at 1590-91, an approach that I, in fact, eschewed. Shachar argues that
I "implicitly assumed that it is possible to determine whether, in all circumstances, a grand-
fathered-effective-date rule would be more efficient than a prospective-effective-date rule." Id.
Instead, I argued that different effective-date rules may be appropriate depending on the extent
of the loss that would otherwise be suffered by certain taxpayers when a tax benefit is repealed.
See Graetz I, supra note i, at 87.
Indeed, Shachar's article fails even to describe accurately my proposal for a transition to a
consumption tax. Shachar asserts that I recommend that no general transitional relief be
extended to mitigate or offset losses resulting from transition from an income tax to a consump-
tion tax. See Shachar, supra note 2, at i581. In fact, I suggested that the effects of the change
from an income tax to a consumption tax could be mitigated by a delayed effective date for all
taxpayers coupled with special transitional relief for the elderly. See Graetz II, supra note i,
at 1649-59; infra pp. 1837-40.
Much of Shachar's article, therefore, attacks a straw man - whom, regretably, Shachar has
chosen to name Michael Graetz. I respond here, however, neither to defend Straw Man nor to
offer a detailed correction of Shachar's mischaracterization of my earlier work, but rather to
reassert briefly my earlier conclusions and to demonstrate the flaws in Shachar's approach.
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In this comment, I respond briefly to Shachar's criticisms. In Part I,
I set out the context and conclusions of my general theory and suggest
that Shachar agrees with its principal insights. In Part II, I show
that, although Shachar correctly suggests that a comprehensive anal-
ysis of transitional rules must take liabilities into account, his central
analytical premise - that "[e]ach increase in the price of an asset has
an equal and offsetting impact on the 'burden' of a liability" - is
surely wrong. 4 I also demonstrate in that Part several difficulties with
Shachar's general approach to transitional problems. Finally, in Part
I, I comment briefly on his specific recommendations for transition
to a consumption tax.
I. My GENERAL CONCLUSIONS REGARDING LEGAL TRANSITIONS
The legal literature that preceded my general analysis of legal
transitions consisted largely of rhetorical condemnations of retroactiv-
ity,5 which, in this context, means the application of new rules to
transactions that have already been consummated. Similarly, the rel-
evant economic literature called for compensation of those who would
otherwise suffer losses resulting from changes in legal rules. 6 The
dominant political approach toward transitions in tax law, both then
and now, has generally reflected these views. 7 Thus, tax legislation
has usually contained provisions, commonly known as "grandfath-
ered" effective dates, that exempt from the new law future income or
deductions derived from transactions consummated before the legis-
4 Shachar, supra note 2, at 1586-87 (footnote omitted). Shachar defines the "burden" of a
liability as "the hypothetical value in money terms that is assigned by the market to a liability
- that is, the sum of money that, if paid in a hypothetical transaction, would suffice to purchase
relief from the liability." Id. at 1587 n.31.
5 See, e.g., Committee on Tax Policy, Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Retroactivity of
Tax Legislation, 29 TAx LAW. 21 (1975); Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A
Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HARV. L. REV. 436 (1970); Comment, Limits on Retroactive Decision
Making by the Internal Revenue Service: Redefining Abuse of Discretion Under Section 78o5(b),
23 UCLA L. REV. 529 (1976).
6 See, e.g., Feldstein, Compensation in Tax Reform, 29 NAT'L TAx J. 123 (1976); Feldstein,
On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77, 94-98 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Feldstein,
Theory]; Hochman, Rule Change and Transitional Equity, in REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUB-
LIC CHOICE 320 (H. Hochman & G. Peterson eds. 1974); cf. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAx REFORM, ch. 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS].
7 See Graetz H, supra note i, at I65O (commenting on the political climate). Representative
Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, recently promised that
any tax legislation in 1985 would avoid "'abrupt and arbitrary changes,"' remarking that "[n]o
person should be penalized tomorrow for doing something that's perfectly permissible today."
Legislator Hopeful on Tax Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1985, Di, col. 6, D21, col. 3. But cf.
I U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 229-32 (1984) (suggesting delayed and phased-in implementation or immediate imple-
mentation as alternatives to grandfathered effective dates for some of the Treasury Department's
proposed tax reforms) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY REPORT].
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lation's enactment date. My first article offered five general conclu-
sions about effective dates in tax legislation - each of which contra-
dicted the existing literature. 8 They warrant brief recapitulation here
to place Shachar's article in its proper context.
A. All Effective Dates Are Retroactive
Because all changes in law, whether nominally retroactive or nom-
inally prospective, will have an economic impact on the value of
existing assets or on existing expectations, the distinctions commonly
drawn between retroactive and prospective effective dates are illu-
sory. 9 Skills are developed, locations selected, and employment ac-
cepted or terminated based upon people's expectations about the future
burdens and rewards of such decisions. Likewise, the economic value
of a physical asset reflects people's expectations about the asset's earn-
ing prospects.' 0 Therefore, purportedly prospective changes in the
law that alter people's expectations about their earning prospects or
their potential savings or consumption, or, as is very often the case,
alter the value of an asset (or liability, as Shachar points out) have
retroactive effects. Understood in this way, all changes in tax law -
indeed, I think, all changes in economic laws - are inherently ret-
roactive. A major contribution of my earlier work was to demonstrate
the essential similarity in economic impact between a change in law
that is nominally retroactive and a change that is nominally prospec-
tive but that also has an effect on the value of past transactions."'
Whenever a change in law alters the relative value of an asset (or
liability) or an individual's expectations about her earning prospects
or her ability to consume or save from accumulated wealth, it can
properly be classified as retroactive. Consequently, one should eval-
uate all possible types of effective dates 12 without concern for the
8 Although congressional sentiment remains largely unchanged, see, e.g., PackwoodlRosten-
kowski Statement on Effective Dates of Tax Reform Plans, 26 TAX NOTES 1192 (Mar. 25, 1985)
("We believe that the effective date of [the tax law change] should not be inconsistent with the
legitimate and reasonable expectations [of the taxpayer] based on law . . . in effect at the time
the [asset] was purchased."), my conclusions have since received support from a number of
quarters, see, e.g., Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 6x TEX. L. REV. 425, 426 &
n.4, 448 & n.68 (1982); Special Comm. on Simplification, Section of Taxation, Am. Bar Ass'n,
Evaluation of the Proposed Model Comprehensive Income Tax, 32 TAx LAw. 563, 676-86
(1979).
9 See Graetz I, supra note i, at 49-63.
10 The economic value of both human and physical capital depends on expectations. For
human capital, skills developed now have value because of the expectation that they will prove
useful in the future. For physical capital, the present value of an asset is determined by the
stream of earnings (or services) it is expected to produce in future years. To the extent that
these future earnings are diverted by government action - by increased taxation, for example
- the asset's present value will decline.
11 See Graetz I, supra note i, at 49-63.
12 I identified six categories of effective dates in my previous article: (i) nominally retroactive
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pejorative label "retroactive" or the misleading and undoubtedly hy-
pothetical designation "prospective."
B. Fairness Does Not Require Protection of Existing Expectations
Proponents of grandfathering assert that a change in the law upsets
expectations unfairly if it directly changes asset (or liability) values.
They claim that people should be able to rely on current law remaining
unchanged with respect to transactions consummated before the en-
actment of a revision. Fairness, the argument runs, requires compen-
sation or grandfathered effective dates to protect people who might
have altered their conduct "in reliance" upon the continued existence
of a tax benefit (or burden). 13 This expectation-based argument, how-
ever, is circular. In short, the argument asserts that people have a
right to protection merely because either they now expect such pro-
tection or they expected such protection when they entered into a
transaction; their expectations allegedly create a right and their as-
serted rights legitimate their expectations. Often this expectation-
based argument amounts to nothing more than an assertion that the
status quo should be shielded from normal legislative change - an
odd claim since people surely expect legislative 'change. That such
expectations actually exist with respect to a particular transaction does
not create a right, or even break the circularity of the argument,
because these expectations arise in large part simply because grand-
father rules or other similar protections have typically accompanied
changes in tax law in the past. 14
The evaluation of claims for transitional relief should be guided
not by the existence of expectations, but rather by some independent
normative vision of what people should be entitled to expect. A
person's claim that she "relied" on existing law or did not "expect"
the change cannot, without more, serve as a justification for protection
from change or for transitional relief. For example, claimants most
deserving of relief, if judged by the unforeseeability of a legal change,
would be those who purchased long-lived assets or made long-term
effective dates, which precede the date of enactment of the legislation; (2) nominally prospective
effective dates, whereby the provision takes effect on the date of enactment or at the beginning
of the year following enactment; (3) delayed effective dates, whereby the provision takes effect
some time after enactment; (4) phased-in effective dates, whereby the change is made effective
in stages over several years; (5) grandfathered effective dates, which exempt from the new rules
future income from transactions entered into before the enactment date; and (6) holder-only
grandfathered effective dates, which exempt from the new rules future income derived by persons
who held the relevant assets on a certain date but not by those who acquired the assets
afterwards. See id. at 52-53; see also Zodrow, Implementing Tax Reform, 34 NAT'L TAx J.
401 (1981) (considering the merits of delayed and phased-in effective dates relative to "immediate
partial enactment").
13 For further elaboration of this argument, see Graetz I,. supra note i, at 73.
14 See id. at 74.
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commitments long before the change was openly contemplated. These
same claims for relief, however, may be very weak if judged by the
impact that the change, if perfectly foreseen, would have had on the
value of the transaction at the outset.15 Tax laws providing subsidies
or other economic benefits are not contractual obligations of the gov-
ernment, nor can they be so understood without significantly inhibiting
the government's ability to adapt to changes in circumstances, tech-
nology, or the tastes and preferences of the populace. Expectations
do not provide a criterion for evaluating claims for transitional relief,
but must themselves be evaluated in light of some criterion of fairness
or efficiency. 16
C. Economic Efficiency Does Not Require Protection of Existing
Expectations
Some commentators have argued that grandfathered effective
dates, or, alternatively, rules directly compensating those who suffer
losses because of changes in the tax law, are economically efficient
because they reduce the economic costs of uncertainty. 17 Martin Feld-
stein, for example, has stated: "Tax changes make individuals uncer-
tain about the future reliability of the tax laws. Their anticipation of
future possible changes induces inefficient precautionary behavior." 18
Uncertainty, however, is a pervasive feature of both market and
political processes. In a majoritarian system, legislators continually
enact, amend, and repeal laws; winners in one period may become
losers in the next. 19 A system of majority rule therefore has inherent
redistributive tendencies. 20 Our constitutional system of government
15 See generally id. at 68-73. I argue that "[tihe special concern in the literature for
commitments made long ago is... misplaced" because "the more distant in the past the original
commitment, the less the taxpayer's present 'reliance' interest." Id. at 71 n.75. The "uncertainty
premium" that purchasers might demand to compensate for potential changes in the law will
decrease as the period between the date of original purchase and the expected date of the change
increases. See id. at 70-71.
16 For arguments that other widely accepted criteria of fairness - for example, notions of
horizontal and vertical equity - also do not routinely justify grandfathered effective dates, see
id. at 79-87.
17 See, e.g., Feldstein, Theory, supra note 6, at 91-94, 98-99.
IS Id. at 93.
19 Although more than a majority vote is required for certain legal changes - constitutional
amendments, for example - unanimity is virtually unknown as a requirement for change. The
Pareto criterion, by which a change is preferable to the status quo only if no one would oppose
the change, is therefore often rejected as unduly limiting. "This method is one of supreme
conservatism. Even a single person opposing a change can block it altogether no matter what
everybody else wants. . . .Clearly there is something grotesquely unsatisfactory about a social
decision rule like this." A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 25 (1970) (footnote
omitted).
20 Outcomes of majoritarian procedures are inherently unstable. There are no practical
voting procedures that have equilibriums and choose efficient points. See, e.g., id. at 2oo. This
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not only guarantees the existence of losers in majoritarian processes,
but also assures that political output will change over time. Given
this institutional context, people should take precautions based upon
their assessment of the probabilities of legislative change. The costs
of uncertainty in the law do not seem necessarily different in kind or
in magnitude from the costs of uncertainty in markets arising from,
for example, changing technology or demand. Markets, as well as
laws, tend to be unpredictable and can produce sizeable economic
losses. Both often reflect underlying changes in tastes and societal
conditions. An economist would not suggest that even sizeable losses
suffered in a market economy by investors as a result of changes in
tastes or circumstances are inefficient. On the contrary, the ability of
the market to adjust output and prices to reflect changes in tastes and
technology is often described as its greatest quality. Why should
efficiency demand that losses be treated differently when they flow
from changes in the political process? Different treatment of the two
kinds of changes often seems to be justified simply by accepting the
theology that changes induced by political processes are inherently
inefficient. 2 1
The efficiency of legislative change, including any accompanying
transition rule, should be determined by whether it creates surplus or
reduces costs. 22 In fact, grandfathered effective dates have significant
costs that are often ignored.23 First, grandfathered effective dates
often significantly delay and sometimes permanently reduce the ben-
efits that are expected to be realized from the change in the law.
Second, grandfathered effective dates often substantially increase com-
plexity and create both planning costs for taxpayers and enforcement
costs for the government. Third, a common practice of grandfathering
often rewards taxpayers and tax advisors who have taken extremely
aggressive tax planning positions. Fourth, the grandfather clause's
exemption of future income may be unnecessary and even wasteful
when compared with alternatives such as delayed or phased-in effec-
tive dates.
observation is detailed in the so-called public choice literature, which analyzes voting rules in
terms of the problems of aggregating individual preferences to satisfy some set of normative
principles. See, e.g., Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, 14 J. ECON. LITERATURE 395, 395,
402-o6 (1976) (discussing majority rule).
21 Market outcomes are sometimes distinguished from political outcomes on the grounds that
the market operates impersonally and therefore does not purposefully impose losses on individ-
uals or groups. The kinds of changes in law considered here should, for our purposes, be
assumed to be of relatively general application and not purposefully designed to impose losses
upon a political minority.
22 See Graetz I, supra note I, at 67-68 (suggesting that proposed policy changes be evaluated
on efficiency grounds under a "potential Pareto-superiority" criterion, often termed the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion, which would favor change whenever "those who would gain from the change
could pay compensation to those who would lose").
23 See id. at 71-72.
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D. The Critical Variable Is Typically the Magnitude of the Loss or
Gain
If all economic legislation can be labeled retroactive, identifying
those transactions that merit some protection from transitional gains
and losses should depend primarily on the magnitude of the gains or
losses. As the magnitude of economic impact from the change in-
creases, the potential for significant financial losses (or gains) increases.
Claims based on the ground that taxpayers altered their behavior or
incurred unwarranted risks become more persuasive as magnitude
increases. Large losses (and perhaps large gains) resulting from
changes in law not only seem more compelling in terms of fairness or
efficiency than do smaller effects, but, as a political matter, they may
also inhibit the willingness of Congress to enact otherwise desirable
changes. Transitional relief, therefore, seems most appropriate - and
sometimes may be indispensable to passage of a desirable tax change
- when the changes in the law would have a large effect on economic
values. Nevertheless, magnitude of loss may not be the only relevant
variable. The Treasury Department, for example, has recently rec-
ommended immediate repeal of "provisions that are particularly ob-
jectionable in terms of violating equity principles."' 24 But as a general
guideline for justifying relief in legal transitions, the magnitude of
economic gains or losses ought to be the crucial variable. Grandfath-
ered, delayed, or phased-in effective dates and immediate partial en-
actment can all reduce the magnitude of these effects. 25
E. Phased-in or Delayed Effective Dates Are Often Preferable to
Grandfathered Effective Dates
My general analysis of effective-date rules, which demonstrated
that magnitude, not retroactivity, is the relevant criterion and that
neither fairness nor efficiency mandates grandfathered effective dates,
led me to argue against congressional practices and policies that tend
to institutionalize expectations of grandfathered effective dates in tax
legislation. 26 It frequently may be politically expedient to avoid im-
posing large losses in order to enact otherwise desirable changes. In
my earlier work, I suggested that phased-in or delayed effective dates
should often be used instead of grandfathering to mitigate particularly
large losses that result from changes in the law. 27
24 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 7, at 331. For a fuller discussion, see Graetz I, supra
note i, at 63-87.
2s See I TREASURY REPORT, supra note 7, at 229; Graetz I, supra note x, at 54-63; Zodrow,
supa note 12, at 401.
26 See Graetz I, supra note i, at 87.
27 See id.
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II. SHACHAR'S EXTENSION
Although Shachar appears to agree generally with these five basic
conclusions of my earlier work, we clearly have different emphases.
For example, he seems less willing than I to view the magnitude of
gains and losses as the crucial criterion for evaluating the need for
transitional relief 28 And Shachar does not clearly either accept or
reject my recommendation that delayed or phased-in effective dates
should frequently be the mechanism used to mitigate large gains or
losses resulting from changes in law. 29 In addition, we do not share
some important empirical assumptions. 30 Most of our genuine dis-
agreement, however, seems to concern the implications of Shachar's
useful analytical addition - the consideration of the effects of tran-
sitional rules on liabilities.
A. Taking Liabilities into Account
My analysis of tax transitions focused primarily on the effect of
changes in tax law on the value of previously acquired assets. Shachar
correctly points out that such changes may also have important effects
on liabilities. He incorrectly concludes, however, that the introduction
of liabilities into the analysis completely alters the transitional prob-
lem. He asserts that "[e]ach increase in the price of an asset has an
equal and offsetting impact on the 'burden' of a liability."' 31 In his
view, analyzing the effect of transition rules on liabilities as well as
on assets demonstrates that "what is at stake is not a net gain or loss
by society, but a transfer of wealth between individual taxpayers."'32
Transition thus becomes a problem solely of distributing the offsetting
gains and losses among the holders of assets and the holders of their
corresponding liabilities. Shachar then follows what is now the stan-
dard economic analysis of law33 to conclude that such losses should
28 See infra pp. 1831-37.
29 Compare Shachar, supra note 2, at 1596 n.61 (stating that he "assume[s] that the burden
of the transition cannot be minimized or eliminated by means of a phased-in or delayed-effective-
date rule"), with id. at 1589 n.** (noting that phased-in or delayed effective dates "might be
employed to minimize the change in asset values"). Cf. id. at i585 ("Under a delayed-effective-
date rule or a phased-in effective-date rule, the effect of the change in the tax law . . . is less
than that under most of the other transition rules.") (footnotes omitted).
30 See infra pp. 1833-37.
31 Shachar, supra note 2, at 1586-87 (footnote omitted).
32 Id. at 1592. Shachar in general ignores the effects of changes in the tax laws on
government revenues (and the related effects on government debt or spending). The revenue
effect means that losses to those involved in the transaction, or even in general, will not, as he
suggests, be precisely offset by gains. Compare Shachar, supra note 2, at I586 & n.28 (discussing
revenue effects), with id. at 1587 (finding losses exactly offset by gains). Moreover, if the change
in law is itself efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense, see supra note 22, gains necessarily exceed
losses.
33 See Shachar, supra note 2, at 159o-99. Shachar adopts the economic analysis of law
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be allocated to the "adversely affected class of taxpayers . . .best
able to bear the risks or spread the losses associated with a given
transition rule."' 34 This conclusion relies principally on his extension
of my analysis of a hypothetical repeal of the income tax exemption
for interest on state and local bonds.
Shachar and I agree. that immediate repeal of the tax exemption
without grandfathering would produce a decline in the value of state
and local bonds,35 which would lead holders of such bonds to demand
a grandfathered effective date or compensation. Shachar contends
that this loss in value would be exactly offset by a gain accruing to
the bond issuers, who "will be able to discharge their liabilities by
repurchasing the bonds at the lower market price."' 36 He concludes
that "bondholders' losses will always be matched by issuers' gains."' 37
This conclusion immediately seems doubtful. The suggestion that
issuers of tax-exempt bonds somehow gain from the repeal of the tax-
exemption - in an amount that exactly offsets the loss to holders of
such bonds - fails to comport with common sense. If this asserted
gain is real, why do state and local governments not clamor for repeal
of the tax exemption? The answer, ignored by Shachar, is that the
issuers would also suffer a loss: they would no longer be able to issue
low-interest tax-exempt bonds. Although state and local governments
would be able to repurchase their old bonds for less than par, they
would have to issue new bonds paying a higher rate of interest if they
wished to continue financing whatever expenses were financed by the
repurchased bonds. The additional cost of issuing new bonds at
higher interest rates would entirely absorb the issuer's apparent gain
from its repurchase of old bonds.
To see this result more concretely, assume that a local government
issued a bond for $i,ooo par value paying 6% tax-exempt interest
when interest rates on taxable bonds of comparable risk and duration
were 8%.38 Repeal of the tax exemption should cause the price of the
bond to fall to somewhere between $822.60 and $864.10; the 6%
interest on the now-taxable municipal bond would equal the 8% return
on comparable corporate bonds. 39 The local government then might,
developed, for example, in Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (i96I), and G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
34 Shachar, supra note 2, at 16o9.
35 See Graetz I, supra note x, at 55-56; Shachar, supra note 2, at 1583-84.
36 Shachar, supra note 2, at 1587 (footnote omitted).
37 Id. (footnote omitted).
38 Shachar uses this numerical example in his article. See id. at 1583-84.
39 The difference depends on the marginal rates of the taxpayers who would purchase the
formerly tax-exempt bonds. A taxpayer in the 50% bracket would pay up to $864.1o for the
tax-exempt bond, whereas a taxpayer in the 20% bracket would pay no more than $822.60.
See id. at 1584.
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as Shachar suggests, 40 repurchase the bond and enjoy an apparent
gain representing the difference between the $i,ooo received upon
issuance of the bond and the repurchase price of, for example, $850.
But to continue financing its projects the local government would
have to issue new bonds and pay interest of 8% rather than 6%. The
local government could issue a new bond of the same maturity as the
bond that paid 6% interest only by giving the purchaser of the new
bond a discount equal to its prior gain on the sale of the old bond.
Shachar errs in his analysis of the repeal of the tax exemption for
state and local bonds because he fails to examine the positions of the
parties immediately before and after the change. 41 After repeal the
bondholder is worse off, because the value of his asset has declined.
The issuer is, with respect to bonds outstanding, no better off, because
its costs of financing will not be reduced over the life of the bond.
And, in the long run, the issuer is worse off, because it can no longer
issue bonds at lower, tax-exempt interest rates.42 Once one puts aside
Shachar's flawed attempt to demonstrate offsetting gains and losses
for holders of assets and liabilities, one may construe Shachar as
merely suggesting that, with respect to bonds outstanding at the date
of enactment of the tax change, issuers as well as bondholders poten-
tially could bear the burden of immediate repeal. 43
40 See id. at 1587.
41 This perspective might be regarded as inappropriate in some other contexts, but it seems
crucial in evaluating effective dates for transitions. Shachar seems to take the view that the
argument about tax transition rules is related to the dispute about whether capital gains due to
changes in the interest rate are income. See id. at 1586-87 & n.28, 1599-16oo; see also N.
KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 44-46, 69-70 (1955) (suggesting that capital gains caused by
a decline in interest rates do not constitute income as it is currently defined). As Professor
Warren has suggested, this dispute turns on which comparison is deemed to be relevant - a
comparison between a bondholder's spending power before and after the change in interest rates
or that between the bondholder and a second bondholder who does not purchase the bond until
after the decline in the interest rates. See Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than
an Income Tax? 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1109-12 (18o). Regardless of how one comes out in this
dispute, in a context in which alternative transitional rules are being evaluated, the relevant
comparison seems to be the status of bondholders and state and local governments before and
after the change in law. One need not agree with Kaldor's position that capital gains caused
by interest rate changes are not income to conclude that proper analysis of transitional rules
should compare the status of issuers and bondholders before and after the change in law. It
should be irrelevant in evaluating alternative transitional rules whether an issuer would be
better off compared to local governments that had issued no tax-exempt bonds, or fewer bonds,
or bonds with shorter maturities, or, alternatively, compared to what the issuer's status would
have been if the tax exemption had never existed. Such comparisons, however, seem to be at
the core of Shachar's analysis of both debt and equity assets.
42 For a different critique of Shachar's bond example, see Abrams, Rethinking Tax Transi-
tions: A Reply to Dr. Shachar, 98 HARV. L. REv. 18O9 (1985).
43 To impose the burden of repeal on state and local governments rather than on bondholders,
Congress could require such governments to increase the interest payable to bondholders, thereby
allowing the bondholders to maintain their after-tax income (and the value of their bonds).
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Shachar's analysis of the effect of a grandfathered effective date
suffers from a parallel flaw. If the tax exemption on state and local
bonds were repealed with a grandfathered effective date, the price of
the outstanding bonds would rise because taxpayers in the highest
bracket, when faced with a dwindling supply of tax-exempt bonds,
would bid up their price. 44 The issuers, Shachar suggests, "would be
able to discharge their liabilities only by paying the higher market
price [and thus] would suffer a loss in wealth, whereas the bondholders
would experience an offsetting gain."' 45 Shachar fails to see, however,
that the issuers need not redeem the bonds at their new higher price;
the issuers are free to leave the bonds outstanding and continue paying
below-market interest on their debts. In fact, higher-bracket taxpay-
ers would always be willing to pay more for the remaining tax-exempt
bonds than would state and local governments, because such govern-
ments, already fully exempt from income taxation, would not receive
any tax benefits from the bonds. If the effective date of the repeal of
the tax preference for interest on state and local bonds were grand-
fathered, although the issuers would no longer be able to repurchase
their bonds at par, they would suffer no loss with respect to bonds
outstanding upon enactment of the tax change. Therefore, the ines-
capable implication of Shachar's analysis - that state and local gov-
ernments would strongly prefer repeal of the tax exemption without
grandfathering to repeal with grandfathering - is clearly false.
The flaw in Shachar's analysis becomes even more apparent when
he turns to equity assets and their "offsetting liabilities." Shachar
contends that the same inevitable parity of bondholders' losses and
issuers' gains also holds for the "value of equity assets and the 'burden'
of equity liabilities."' 46 He attempts to demonstrate this proposition
by considering the situation of an owner-lessor who receives tax-
exempt rents on an industrial building subject to a fixed-rent, twenty-
year lease. 47 Given Shachar's assumptions about the competitiveness
of the relevant rental market, 48 this case is economically identical to
Shifting the burden of repeal to state and local governments, however, might well run afoul of
a constitutional prohibition relating to that barring the impairment of contracts. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. x (contract clause); cf. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S.
234 (1978) (invalidating under the contract clause the Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Pro-
tection Act as applied retroactively to existing pension plans); United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that the contract clause prohibited New York and New Jersey
from repealing a covenant limiting the ability of their jointly-established port authority to
subsidize rail transportation). The contract clause applies only to the states, but a due process
claim might be raised against a federal requirement of the sort set forth above.
44 Shachar and I are in agreement on this proposition. Compare Shachar, supra note 2, at
1587 n.3o (stating that "bonds' market value would rise"), with Graetz I, supra note i, at 61
(stating that the supply of bonds will shrink, and their value will rise).
4S Shachar, supra note 2, at 1587 n.3o (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 1588.
47 See id.
48 See id. at i588 n.31.
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the tax-exempt bond case. Upon repeal of the tax-exemption for rent,
the argument runs, the loss to the lessor from the decline in value of
the building "offsets" the gain to the lessee, who, because his rent is
now below-market, could sell his interest in the lease at a premium
above its pre-repeal value. As in the bond example, Shachar again
ignores the fact that the lessee, if he wanted to continue in business,
would then have to use that premium to pay higher rents elsewhere. 49
Shachar has extended his analysis to equity assets and "equity
liabilities" by hypothesizing an obligation that creates a relationship
that is identical to the debtor-creditor relationship in his tax-exempt
bond example. The new example merely illustrates that some equity
assets have the same economic characteristics as those of assets rou-
tinely labeled debt.5 0 But not all equity assets present such relation-
ships. Assume, for example, that the current tax exemption for the
imputed rental value of owner-occupied homes were repealed. Shach-
ar's lease example implies that each homeowner's loss from the re-
sulting decline in the value of his house would exactly offset his gain
from the increase in "the value of his right to occupy the premises."''s
Shachar's analysis suggests that homeowners should be indifferent
about the repeal of the tax exemption, since they are on both the
"winning" and "losing" sides of this transition. The homeowners,
however, would more likely regard their losses as real and their gains
as illusory; they would surely contend that their reliance on the tax
exemption when they purchased their homes entitles them to a grand-
fathered effective date or other transitional relief.
Shachar seems to assume that in the absence of macroeconomic
changes, aggregate personal income remains constant.5 2 He therefore
might respond to my criticism by contending that any decline in the
price of certain equity assets that is caused by a change in tax law
will be offset by a rise in the price of other assets rather than by a
gain to liability holders. The lease example then becomes simply a
special case that easily demonstrates who (the lessee in that case)
would enjoy the asserted offsetting gain. 53 When the price of some
49 Even gains that are not fictional will not offset losses when assets are held by parties
taxed at different marginal rates. Assume, for example, that a lessor would pay up to $ioo to
the lessee for release from the lease. If both parties were taxed at a marginal rate of 50%, the
lessor would lose $So after tax on the transaction, and the lessee would gain $So after tax. If,
however, the lessor were taxed at a marginal rate of 5o% but the lessee were taxed at a marginal
rate of 20%, the lessor would lose $So while the lessee would gain $8o. The market cannot
adjust for all of these differentials. See, e.g., Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax
Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 739-44 (1979).
Shachar takes variations in marginal rates into account on some occasions but not on others.
50 This point has been amply illustrated by, for example,- the difficulties of drawing a clear
distinction between debt and equity for purposes of the income tax. See I.R.C. § 385 (x982)
(setting forth factors that should be considered in determining whether an interest in a corpo-
ration is stock or indebtedness).
s See Shachar, supra note 2, at 1588.
52 See id. at 1586 n.28.
53 Professor Warren has advanced the position that a decline in the value of equity assets
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equity assets declines because of repeal of their tax-favored status,
Shachar might argue, the price of other equity assets rises a corre-
sponding amount. Shachar might therefore argue, for example, that
repeal of the tax exemption for owner-occupied homes might cause
not only a decline in the value of such housing but also an offsetting
rise in the value of substitutes such as apartment buildings. Similarly,
repeal of the tax preference for capital gains would cause a decline in
the value of capital assets and presumably an offsetting rise in the
value of ordinary income assets such as inventory. Shachar would
presumably have us compare the loser's losses on a given equity asset
with the "offsetting" winner's gains on all substitute assets. If this
comparison is what Shachar means to capture in his argument, his
transformation of all transitional issues into questions of the appro-
priate distribution of offsetting gains and losses loses much of its
analytical power. As I suggest in the next Section, analyzing the
distribution of transitional gains and losses is useful only when the
gains and losses accrue to the members of a relatively small, discrete
group, such as "bond issuers." When gains, losses, or both instead
accrue to the members of a large, generalized group such as "all asset
holders," Shachar's proposed criteria for distinguishing among tran-
sitional rules will always yield the same unhelpful results.
B. Shachar's View of Equitable and Efficient Transitions
Taking liabilities into account does not eliminate the need to eval-
uate alternative transitional rules for both fairness and efficiency.
Despite the many flaws in his basic analytical premise - that impacts
on liabilities always offset impacts on assets - Shachar's proposed
framework for evaluating transitional rules merits comment. I first
examine Shachar's suggested equitable criteria for evaluating transi-
tion rules and then discuss his approach to efficiency.
i. Shachar's Equitable Criteria. - According to Shachar, one can
examine transitional rules for fairness by evaluating their capacity,
first, to spread losses and, second, to protect the rational expectations
of taxpayers. 5 4 The first criterion, loss spreading, is designed "to
minimize the concentration of transition-related losses in wealth on
any single individual or class of individuals"; therefore, he argues,
"the legislature should select a transition rule that will place the losses
on the party that is best able to spread it to the general public."55 In
the case of tax-exempt bonds, Shachar asserts that "the public is more
always offsets gains in the value of other assets. See Warren, supra note 41, at 1o86-9o.
Warren defines income in the societal sense as "the product of the whole society's private capital
and labor during the accounting period," id. at io86, and in the personal sense as the sum of
consumption and net accretions in wealth, see id. (cited in Shachar, supra note 2, at x586 n.28).
54 See Shachar, supra note 2, at 16o9.
55 Id. at 1595--96.
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capable than individual bondholders of absorbing the burden without
extraordinary hardship" and that the issuers - state and local gov-
ernments - can better "spread the burden to the public" than can
the bondholders. 56 Therefore, he concludes, his first equitable crite-
rion favors a grandfathered effective date for the repeal of the tax-
exemption for bonds.5 7
If, as Shachar asserts, transitions create offsetting gains and losses
between discrete groups of holders of assets and corresponding liabil-
ities, one might be able to compare usefully the loss-spreading abilities
of the two groups. But, as I demonstrated in the preceding Section,
such offsetting gains and losses do not always exist. In fact, Shachar's
conclusion that equity favors grandfathering for tax-exempt bonds
does not depend on his earlier analysis of liabilities. Whether or not
bond issuers realize offsetting gains upon repeal of the tax exemption,
the general public could bear the losses that bondholders suffer by
compensating them directly or by implementing grandfathered effec-
tive dates.5 8 Because compensation or grandfathering spares the
bondholders any loss and passes the entire burden of tax transitions
to the federal fisc - that is, spreads losses to the public - grand-
fathering will tend to be the favored transitional rule under a loss-
spreading criterion.5 9 Although Shachar denies that he is arguing for
a presumption in favor of grandfathering, his loss-spreading criterion
resurrects just such a presumption. 60 Moreover, Shachar assumes that
phased-in or delayed effective date rules are not available to reduce
the burden of transitions on groups such as the bondholders and
therefore fails to consider their capacity for spreading some portion of
the losses to the general public. Thus, in this context at least, he
ignores the course that I recommended. 61 His loss-spreading criterion
therefore fails to accomplish its stated purpose of differentiating among
alternative transition rules.
The second criterion of Shachar's equity analysis, which he char-
acterizes as the capacity of a transition rule to protect taxpayers'
reliance and expectation interests, 62 also suffers from infirmities.
Shachar explicitly accepts my conclusion that taxpayers have no right
56 Id. at 1596 (footnote omitted).
s7 See id.
58 This proposition, when stated prescriptively, is Professor Feldstein's basic argument, see
sources cited supra note 6, with which my work disagrees.
59 Professor Feldstein also has chosen the general public, or large segments of the public, to
bear the losses caused by tax transitions. See sources cited supra note 6; cf. Calabresi, supra
note 33, at 518 (favoring enterprise tort liability as a means of "allocating losses in ways which
spread the burden over as many people and over as long a time as is possible," typically through
lower employee wages and higher consumer prices).
60 Shachar considers direct compensation of losses to be an alternative to grandfathered
effective dates. See Shachar, supra note 2, at 1597 n.64.
61 See supra p. 1826.
62 See Shachar, supra note 2, at 1596.
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to expect all tax laws to remain forever unchanged. 63 He contends,
however, that taxpayers may "legitimately expect" government to
adopt transition rules that allocate transition-related losses efficiently,
that is, "in a manner that reflects the market's previous allocation of
the risk of a change in tax policy." 64 Shachar does not explain why
this expectation is legitimate; rather he seems merely to assert that
whatever economic efficiency demands is necessarily fair. 65
Indeed, by defining fairness in relation to the market's previous
allocation of the risks of change, Shachar implicitly renders taxpayers'
expectations irrelevant to any consideration of equity. He asserts that
"the market automatically capitalizes the risk of a change in the tax
law and allocates the cost of bearing that risk to the superior risk
bearer." 66 I do not have space here to detail the uncertainty and
controversy over what the market in fact capitalizes in connection
with tax-favored (or tax-disfavored) assets and liabilities. 67 If, how-
ever, the market not only capitalizes tax benefits to equate after-tax
returns, but also capitalizes the risks of changes in the tax law,
transitions would seem to raise few problems of equity or efficiency.68
As Richard Posner has queried: why should we worry about either
the equity or efficiency consequences of changes in the tax law for
persons who engaged in market transactions on terms that appropri-
ately reflected the risks of such changes? 69 After all, he suggests, the
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Shachar's focus on taxpayers' expectations as a criterion of fairness for transitional rules
seems likely to reinstate a presumption for grandfathering. See Graetz I, supra note x, at 74-
79; supra pp. 1823-24.
66 Shachar, supra note 2, at 1597.
67 General works on this topic include Bittker, supra note 49; Galper & Toder, Measuring
the Incidence of Taxation of Income front Capital, 75 NAT'L TAx ASS'N - TAx INST. OF Am.
PROC. 57 (1983); Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income Tax Revision: Some
Lessons from Incidence Analysis, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1975); and Warren, The Relation and
Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719 (1g8i). For
example, Warren makes the following observations concerning market adjustments to the cor-
porate income tax:
The validity of the proposition that the market has fully capitalized in share prices the
detriments of current law is certainly questionable. . . . [I]t may be that any discount [in
the price of a corporation's stock] is due to the difference between ordinary income and
capital gains rates, rather than the corporate tax.
Warren, supra, at 757 (footnotes omitted).
68 Shachar asserts in a footnote that the model of the market underpinning this second equity
criterion - perfect allocation of risk to the superior risk-bearer - "applies only if there is no
information about the way that government is likely to act during a transition." Shachar, supra
note 2, at 1597 n.63. Notwithstanding the well-known fact that information asymmetries may
cause certain kinds of market failure, I question this premise; for example, the existence of
widespread information about government's prior transition policies may reduce the perceived
risk that government will alter its policies, but why would the market fail to allocate to the
superior risk-bearer any remaining risk?
69 Posner made this query when I presented a draft of Graetz I, supra note i, at a University
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market price of such transactions offered buyers a discount for bearing
the risk of losses and afforded sellers a premium for forgoing possible
future gains.
Shachar further suggests that the market will capitalize people's
expectations that arise as a result of government's consistent transi-
tional policies; therefore, he argues that government must honor these
expectations by keeping its approach to transitions constant. But this
argument simply restates the circle of expectations. People become
entitled to grandfathering because the government previously grand-
fathered, which created an expectation of grandfathering, which ex-
pectation needs to be fulfilled by implementing grandfathering. Fur-
thermore, if the market can so cleverly capitalize both the benefits of
tax-favored treatment and the risks of changes in such treatment, why
does it not also capitalize the risks of a change in the government's
approach to transitional rules? And if the market capitalizes all of
these risks, why should we worry about the effects of changing either
the substantive tax law or the policy regarding transitions? The mar-
ket, if it is as powerful as Shachar apparently believes, would seem
to have appropriately and "automatically" allocated the entire risk "to
the superior risk bearer" - the very allocation that Shachar also
suggests economic efficiency requires. 70
2. Shachar's Efficiency Criterion. - Shachar suggests that one
can evaluate alternative transition rules for economic efficiency as well
as for equity by comparing the risk-bearing abilities of those whom
each rule would adversely affect. Unlike his two fairness criteria, this
efficiency criterion might well provide some independent basis for
evaluating the merits of taxpayers' claims for transitional relief.
The notion that legal rules should impose losses on the superior
risk-bearer, "the party who can more efficiently insure against the
particular risk in question,"' 71 is not novel, although it has been
applied principally with respect to private law. As Shachar notes,
this approach has been offered as a test for the efficiency of contract
law, 72 and it also forms the basic premise of the economic analysis of
tort rules for allocating the risks of accidents. 73 The risk-spreading
criterion has also recently been used to evaluate changes in public
law, 74 and Shachar's proposal that we consider how it might apply to
changes in tax law deserves attention.
of Chicago workshop in 1977. One may still worry for efficiency reasons about the consequences
of changes in the tax law. See infra pp. 1835-37.
70 See Shachar, supra note 2, at 1597. Market failures may cause such "automatic" risk
allocations to prove less than perfectly efficient even if most people take risks of change into
account.
71 Id. at 1593 n.52.
72 See id.
73 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 33; Calabresi, supra note 33.
74 See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72
CALIF. L. REv. 569 (1984).
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As Shachar suggests, assessing relative risk-bearing capacities may
be informed by determining to whom the market would have allocated
these risks if it had been able to do so appropriately. He follows the
general literature by suggesting that one might approach this question
by determining which transitional rule would carry the lowest cost in
a hypothetical market for insurance against the risks of alternative
transitional rules. 75 Unfortunately, Shachar's discussion of the risk-
spreading criterion has limited value. Shachar again ignores the risk-
spreading capabilities of phased-in or delayed effective dates.76 More-
over, his discussion here also turns on his mistaken conclusion that
every change in the tax law that causes a loss to an asset holder entails
an equal, offsetting gain to a liability holder. 77 For example, when
considering transitional rules that allocate the burden of the repeal of
a tax exemption for bonds, Shachar compares the risk-bearing capa-
bility of bond issuers and bondholders. But whether issuers could
theoretically bear risks better than bondholders is irrelevant, because
bond issuers in fact do not bear the risk of loss or gain with respect
to outstanding bonds. A change in the tax law would not affect the
cost of the issuers' obligation or the "burden" of its liability.
Although I do not here rigorously evaluate the validity of risk-
bearing as a distinguishing criterion, a full treatment of it seems likely
to support the principal conclusions of my general theory of transi-
tions. The magnitude of risk will certainly prove to be a critical
variable: 78 when people can insure against risk, generally they choose
to insure against disasters - by passing the risk to superior risk-
75 See Shachar, supra note 2, at 1596. It is not at all clear why no such insurance market
exists. Insurance is available, for example, against the risks of expropriation by foreign gov-
ernments. In the tax context, it may be simply that the practice of grandfathering adverse
changes is so widespread that there is little demand for insurance protection. Insurance com-
panies might also fear the withdrawal from the political process of persuasive proponents of
grandfathering, if such advocates were insured. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
Shachar also notes that an income tax itself may provide some appropriate spreading of risks.
See Shachar, supra note 2, at 1597 n.64; cf. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 74, at 594-95
(viewing the property tax as partial "coinsurance" against regulatory changes that would alter
property value "because property losses result in lower tax liabilities"). For discussion of the
inherent risk-spreading tendencies of a capital income tax, see J. Strnad, The Taxation of Risky
Investments: An Asset Pricing Approach (Calif. Inst. of Tech. Soc. Sci. Working Paper No.
546) (1984). Shachar further implies that taxpayers' abilities to diversify might affect their risk-
spreading abilities. See Shachar, supra note 2, at 1594.
76 See supra note 61. Shachar also blurs the relevant distinctions between risk- and loss-
spreading. For example, he contends that one should ask in the case of tax-exempt bonds
whether issuers or borrowers are better able to insure against the risk of change in the law.
See Shachar, supra note 2, at 1593. He adds that the loss should then be imposed on the party
better able to spread it to the general public. See id. at 1595-96.
77 See supra pp. 1827-32.
78 See supra p. 1826. For a related view that administrative costs may be significant for a
compensation system and therefore compensation should not always be pursued, see Blume &
Rubinfeld, supra note 74, at 624.
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bearers - and choose to bear the risk of small losses themselves. 79
Transitional relief in the form of a phased-in or delayed effective date,
or even grandfathering, may thus be more appropriate for tax law
changes involving large losses or affecting assets that comprise a large
portion of an individual's wealth - a principal residence, for example
- because in such cases the individual might not be able readily to
self-insure by diversifying.80 Similarly, changes affecting income from
occupations that require significant job-specific education or training
expenses might warrant relief because of the taxpayers' inability to
diversify risks. For example, if the formerly tax-exempt fringe benefits
of airline pilots became taxable, a pilot might not be able to react to
her reduced after-tax income by readily transferring her skills and
experience to some other occupation.
In contrast, large corporations and wealthier individuals are typi-
cally well diversified and would be less deserving of protection through
grandfathering. 8l Moreover, because wealthier people and large cor-
porations often exercise a disproportionate influence over political out-
comes, they might present special problems of "moral hazard" that
would also argue against grandfathering.8 2 Finally, people's relative
aversion to risk is also important to an analysis of risk-spreading.
The standard assumption that risk aversion declines as wealth in-
creases suggests that wealthier people may have less need than poorer
people for grandfathering to protect them from losses resulting from
changes in tax law. Thus, contrary to the impressions given by Sha-
char's incomplete analysis, a risk-bearing criterion might well support
far less grandfathering than he seems to suggest - certainly far less
than is routinely provided by the legislative process.
III. THE TRANSITION TO A CONSUMPTION TAx
When I considered the problems of transition from an income tax
to a progressive consumption tax, I applied the general principles set
forth in Part I to suggest that transitional relief might be most appro-
79 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 74, at 591.
80 See id. at 591-92, 6o6-IO.
81 See id. at 588. Such diversification against the risks of a change in law, for example,
might provide an explanation for why high-bracket taxpayers hold taxable corporate bonds of
comparable risk to tax-exempt state or local bonds in circumstances in which the latter would
produce a higher after-tax rate of return.
The conclusion that wealthier people are less deserving of relief is set forth in my earlier
work applying traditional notions of vertical equity. See Graetz I, supra note x, at 81-83.
82 "Moral hazard" is a term commonly used by economists to describe a particular type of
market failure common to insurance markets. Moral hazard occurs when a party who is to be
insured can affect the probability or the magnitude of the event that produces insurance
compensation. In this context, moral hazard might occur because the person might be able to
affect the outcome of the political process. For a discussion of this failure and other relevant
potential insurance market failures, see Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 74, at 593-97.
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priate for elderly taxpayers, who would tend to suffer relatively large
increases in tax burdens without comparable offsetting benefits from
such a shift and that grandfathered effective dates should generally
be rejected in favor of phased-in or delayed effective dates. 83 I re-
jected general transitional relief for pre-enactment assets because the
benefits of such relief did not seem to exceed its costs in the form of
increased tax rates, complexity, and expenses of enforcement and
administration. Moreover, the consumption tax deduction for rein-
vestment would serve generally to mitigate hardships suffered by
owners of significant amounts of assets.
I also concluded, however, that if general "relief is to be granted
with respect to assets acquired before enactment, it should take the
form of an immediate deduction of the basis of assets held on the date
of enactment (perhaps limited to a maximum dollar amount... ).,,84
Shachar makes a similar recommendation, 85 but instead of noting the
similarity, he characterizes my position as simply recommending "that
no general transitional relief be extended to mitigate or offset [tran-
sitional] losses."' 86 Although my discussion did not address similar
transition problems for liabilities, I tend to agree with Shachar that
if Congress were to prevent windfall losses for asset holders through
a special basis rule, it should prevent windfall gains for liability
holders by using parallel restrictions.
Shachar and I do differ over the appropriate method for analyzing
what both of us, following the Treasury Department's suggestion, 87
label "carryover problems." Carryover problems occur in the transi-
tion from an income tax to a consumption tax because people have
accumulated wealth under an income tax that they consume under a
consumption tax. As a Treasury report explains, "[c]arryover prob-
lems would occur to the extent that changes in the tax code affect the
taxation of income earned in the past but not yet subject to tax or,
conversely, income taxed in the past that may be subject to a second
tax."' 88 Shachar defines carryover problems as those that "reflect the
tax system's failure to account for all relevant items of a taxpayer's
tax basis."' 89 He regards carryover problems as "clearly distinguish-
able" from changes in law that are reflected by changes in asset (or
83 See Graetz II, supra note x, at 1653, x657-58. My rejection of grandfathered effective
dates in favor of phased-in or delayed effective dates was reached in a long, general article on
implementing a progressive consumption tax. For a discussion of issues raised by transition
from an income tax to a consumption tax, see Graetz II, supra note i, at 1649-59; Shachar,
supra note 2, at 1599-i6o8.
84 Graetz II, supra note I, at i655.
85 See Shachar, supra note 2, at x6o8.
86 Id. at 1581.
87 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 6, at 182-85; Graetz HI, supra note x, at 1655; Shachar,
supra note 2, at 1581.
88 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 6, at 181.
89 Shachar, supra note 2, at 16o5.
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liability) pricds because they are "not endemic to all tax transitions:
they arise only when the tax transition entails a change in the method
of calculating the tax base." 90
Although Shachar regards losses due to carryover problems as
analytically different from losses attributable to price changes, he does
not suggest what this difference implies. In fact, he treats carryover
problems similarly to price changes by analyzing them under his
general transitional methodology. 91 He also fails to consider that
special transitional relief would not be costless; for example, it would
almost certainly require higher tax rates to maintain a revenue-neutral
shift to a consumption tax. 92
Shachar's approach to carryover problems is distinctive because
he suggests that one should evaluate the fairness of transitional relief
with reference to any fundamental shift in norms that accompanies a
shift in the approach to taxation. For example, as Shachar puts it,
the shift from an income tax to a consumption tax would indicate
that "society perceived . . . 'spending power' to be a more relevant
indicator of economic welfare than" earning power.93 I agree that one
should be alert for any such shift in norms. 94 Ultimately, however,
Shachar seems to slip into expectation-based arguments for protecting
taxpayers from losses due to carryover problems. 95 To the extent that
such arguments form the basis of proposals for transitional protection,
I reject them for the reasons set forth above. 96
I also remain unpersuaded by Shachar's assertion that one should,
in general, treat gains and losses from carryover problems differently
from gains and losses from price changes. I continue to believe that
the basic "element common to both problems is that relative wealth
has been changed because of the change in the tax law" and that the
"problems are similar in their broadest economic effects." ' 9 7 Moreover,
the relevant criterion for evaluating claims for transitional relief should
not be the expectations of taxpayers but rather the magnitude of their
gains and losses. The taxpayer who faces large losses, whether at-
tributable to carryover problems or price changes, has the stronger
case for transitional relief. Finally, I reassert my previous stance that
90 Id.
91 See id. at 16o9.
92 See Graetz II, supra note i, at 1655.
93 Shachar, supra note 2, at 16o9.
94 I have no quarrel with Shachar's suggestion that one should be alert to the norms
underlying the reason for the change; I argued in my first article on this subject that the equity
and efficiency of transitional rules in income tax revisions should be evaluated with reference
to the basic norms of income taxation. See Graetz I, supra note i, at 79-81.
95 See Shachar, supra note 2, at 6o5 (emphasizing expectations of persons who "planned"
to sell assets before maturity).
96 See supra pp. 1823-25.
97 Graetz I, supra note i, at 51.
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delayed or phased-in effective dates can often provide relief more fairly
and efficiently than grandfathering.
IV. CONCLUSION
Shachar and I seem to find some significant common ground. I
regard him as supporting rather than rejecting the major conclusions
of my earlier work, and I agree with his basic suggestion that one
should take into account the effects of liabilities on transitional rules
in tax reform generally and in any transition from an income tax to
a consumption tax. Nevertheless, I reject a large part of Shachar's
argument. First, I reject his basic analytical premise that every "in-
crease in the price of an asset has an equal and offsetting impact on
the 'burden' of a liability."' 98 Moreover, in considering losses that
result from changes in the law, I disagree with Shachar's view that
choices among transitional rules should turn on who is best able to
spread losses. Notwithstanding Shachar's denial, this aproach would
effectively reaffirm grandfathering as the dominant transitional prac-
tice. Some of our disagreements, however, are far less significant.
For example, I agree that examining the relative risk-spreading ability
of affected taxpayers seems to be a potentially useful inquiry when
evaluating transitional rules, but it is not the only relevant inquiry.
Although Shachar unfortunately did not develop the policy implica-
tions of a risk-spreading criterion, such an evaluation would seem
generally to support my earlier analysis and to affirm the appropri-
ateness of transitional rules similar to those that I have previously
proposed. In any event, a risk-spreading criterion would justify far
fewer occasions for grandfathering tax changes affecting wealthier
individuals and corporations than Shachar seems to suggest. Finally,
although I have recommended more limited relief, I have no quarrel
with Shachar's principal new suggestion for dealing with a transition
from an income tax to a consumption tax; he correctly proposes that
if the basis of assets is exempted from consumption tax receipts,
Congress should not allow deductions for the repayment of pre-enact-
ment liabilities.
In sum, I adhere to my earlier conclusions that arguments
grounded in condemnations of "retroactive" changes are fundamen-
tally flawed and analytically incoherent, that arguments based on
taxpayers' expectations are generally circular, and that the need for
transitional relief should generally depend upon the magnitude of
losses resulting from changes in the law. Congress often seems un-
willing to impose the economic losses that would result from otherwise
desirable changes in law. In the tax context, at least, a general policy
of reducing large losses may well be necessary to ensure the willingness
98 Shachar, supra note 2, at 1586-87 (footnote omitted).
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of representative democratic political institutions to respond to changes
in tastes or circumstances. But large losses can frequently be better
mitigated by phased-in or delayed effective dates than by grandfath-
ering. The political appeal of grandfathered effective dates to neu-
tralize opposition to changes in law by those who would otherwise
suffer from the change has produced in Congress a virtually automatic
tendency to adopt grandfathered effective date provisions. This ten-
dency in turn creates expectations of grandfathering for future
changes. Nothing in Shachar's article or in the events of the nearly
ten years since I first analyzed the problem of transitions has led me
to waver in my recommendation that this practice should cease. The
search for other imaginative approaches to the problems of transitions
must continue.
